## 1NC

### Framework

**The affirmative’s failure to read a topical plan undermines debate’s transformative potential**

 **“Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision**

Jeff Parcher 1, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

**“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means**

Ericson ’03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**Debate over a clear and specific controversial point of government action creates argumentative stasis – that’s a prerequisite to the negative’s ability to engage in the conversation — that’s critical to deliberation**

**Steinberg 8**, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

**Deliberation is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy**

**Steinberg**, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

**Attempts to influence policy from outside of the state fails - only working within institutions can create productive change**

Silverstein ’02 (Marc, Anarchist Communitarian Network, “Breaking Free of the Protest Mentality”, 4-25,

<http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/Discus/2002-04-25Silverstein.htm>)

But it seems that if a "movement" is going to be built, it needs a rational, comprehensive, holistic analysis of the current situation, and a **fleshed-out, detailed, practical strategy** to achieve whatever it is that happens to be its goals. The means must be consistent with the ends. This analysis and strategy would give direction to a movement and would act as a vehicle for personal and social transformation. What is alarming is the complete lack of any serious analysis or strategy, or even any concern over a lack of analysis or strategy, and the crowd's willingness, even eagerness to shout slogans, hold signs, and regurgitate the rhetoric of the speakers. Estimates for this march were put at 10-15,000 by the mainstream media and 75-100,000 by the independent media (both of whom exaggerate numbers to serve their particular agenda). Regardless, the march was in the tens of thousands. It seems that 50,000 people would be able to gather together and deliberate on a grassroots level, based on free association, through networks of affinity groups and spokes-councils, their strategic and organizational **plan of action**. Instead, those same 50,000 people chose to walk around as an amorphous mass, chanting, holding signs, letting the government know how bad and inhuman it is and how it should stop funding murderous states, and basically putting themselves in a humiliating position of powerlessness. Protestors are in the classic role of "protestors", people with no real power over their lives so they must demand it from the ruling class. Demonstrations also point to a lack of creativity; the only thing we can come up with is playing the song and dance of our rulers. How much longer will these protests go on for? If we could only get a few more tens of thousands to protest, will we be successful in overthrowing capitalism, the state and wage-slavery? Why do the state, capitalism and wage-slavery exist, why do the governments of the U.S. and Israel do what they do, and what are we actually going to do about it? One of the speakers, from a Muslim rights group, appealed to President Bush to warn Ariel Sharon that if he doesn't stop his war crimes, then immediate action will be taken. It is unbearably painful to witness such utter naivety. It is quite apparent that genocide and "war crimes" are normal functions of any state, that they are not doing anything irresponsible. The state will do anything to maintain its power, whether legal or illegal. Leftists and progressives point out that Israel has violated the Geneva Convention, and that their activity is "illegal". By accepting the false dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal" we are accepting their frame of reference and their world-view. We are viewing the situation from a liberal, idealistic perspective, of how the state is supposed to behave. Radicals and revolutionaries over a hundred years ago recognized the essential purpose of the state and capitalism, they weren't fooled by it, and they weren't sucked in by reformism. It seems we are a long way to go to reach the same logical conclusions that were reached in the 1870s! There seems to be a lack of prefigurative politics, or even an understanding of what that means. Prefigurative politics is based on the notion that the "future society" is how we act in the present, what kinds of interactions, processes, structures, institutions, and associations we create right now, and how we live our lives. The notion that we just need more people, more resources, and more money to be channeled into these protests is utterly naïve, because it mistakes the problem as being quantitative, when in fact it is qualitative. The qualitative component deals with how we treat each other, the quality of people's lives, meeting individual wants and preferences, strengthening our ability to clearly and honestly communicate with each other our concerns, needs, feelings, and requests, in the context of a small-scale face-to-face environment. On the other hand, protests are mostly concerned with numbers, masses, and large, bureaucratized organizations, concerns which all too often ignore the crucial individual and inter-personal aspects. The protests against the G-8 conference last July in Genoa, Italy included up to 200,000 demonstrators, yet the only outcomes of the protest were a militarized police state bordering on fascism (or perhaps fascist), one dead, and many imprisoned and seriously injured. The strategy of protest doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere, so it is a wonder why people continue to engage in this failed tactic. If a methodology is proven time and time again of not being successful, then the rational response would be to critically examine the inadequacies of the unsuccessful methodology, and creatively and collectively think up and experiment with new methodologies. The few instances when these mass demonstrations are critiqued, they are rarely ever rejected in toto; instead the solution is to have protests on the level of local communities and neighborhoods, rather than mass convergences to large cities. Their argument is that this would bridge the gap between activists and "regular people" and get more people active and radicalized in their local communities, and to have a more secure base of resistance. But the size of the protests are not the real problem, the real problem is the protest mentality itself, which remains qualitatively the same whether it's in a working-class neighborhood or in a major city. Most of the corporate media reported that the protests were overwhelmingly "peaceful", and many of the protestors were quite content with this. Both sides accept the dichotomy of "peaceful"/"violent", just as they accept the dichotomy of "legal"/"illegal". This traps them into a moralistic, Statist mindset. Even the militant black bloc in past protests has never failed to mention that "property destruction is not violence", which indicates that they still accept this basic duality. The media are our enemy, their interests are antithetical to ours, and to hope for any kind of "positive coverage" is pie in the sky. We should not be surprised if the police beat and arrest us, if the media defame us, and if the general public hate us. That is to be expected, and we should start to recognize this and move on. There doesn't seem to be so much a "movement" as there is a collection of divergent tendencies and ideologies, many of them incompatible with each other. With every protest, there has been very little attention to what we hope to achieve, and the claim that all protests, demonstrations, marches and rallies are useless and counter-productive is a new and shocking concept for most activists. The reason that the vast majority of "ordinary people" view us with fear and contempt is because we have nothing to offer them. The power of capitalism and the State does not exist in the streets, in blocking and shutting down major intersections. It exists in the everyday lives of people, more specifically: in their homes, workplaces, and communities. If we don't work on creating **practical alternatives** to the capitalist system, then it is no wonder most people won't join us - we don't offer them anything, and our petty squabbles are totally irrelevant to their lives. The strategy I propose is of creating spheres of autonomy and self-sufficiency based on free association and common preference finding: bolos, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, counter-institutions, popular assemblies (see: http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=8614 for a contemporary example), small-scale decentralized agriculture, community gardens en masse, guilds, kibbutzes, worker-owned cooperatives, squats, local barter clubs (which have been popping up throughout parts of Argentina, see: http://www.infoshop.org/inews/stories.php? story=02/03/02/5676701, communist stores (based on the principle of "take what you need, donate what you can"), co-housing, urban and rural intentional communities, alternative and sustainable technology, computer-linked networks for co-ordinating and making decisions on a large-scale basis. Computer-linked networks may in fact supercede entirely the need for popular assemblies. The reason that creating these types of anti-authoritarian structures is a much more worthwhile strategy than protest and direct confrontation with the State is because it hits the State and capitalism where it hurts. Food Not Bombs, Independent Media Centers, micro-radio and the like are also important, but they don't provide people with food, clothing, and housing - that is, the real necessities of life. The Black Panthers' Party in the 1960s and 70s set up free breakfast and lunch programs for neighborhood kids, community medical clinics, and self-defense classes. The fact that these counter-institutions triggered so much State repression, sometimes more so than armed struggle, shows how effective and threatening they were to the State. Keith Preston, in "Anarchism or Anarcho-Social Democracy?", writes: "Strategically, we need to follow the example of the most successful anarchist forces of all time- the Spanish anarchist revolutionaries. Our revolutionary agenda should be to develop an alliance of community organizations, unions, cooperatives, enterprises, service organizations, youth clubs, study groups and other popular associations". What I've sketched above are just a few outlines of a strategy, described abstractly, which embodies the kind of direction I think we should be going in. The protest mentality is getting us nowhere, it is a strategy of powerlessness - it is not "what democracy looks like". If we are serious about doing away with this rotten system and living in a new way, we have to know what it is that we don't want, **what it is we do want, and how to go about getting what we want.** What we need is a new, radical, concrete, utopian praxis, free of the failed methodologies of Leftism, activism and protest.

### T-restrictions

#### The only War Power authority is the ability to MAKE MILITARY DECISIONS

Bajesky 13 (2013¶ Mississippi College Law Review¶ 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 9¶ LENGTH: 33871 words ARTICLE: Dubitable Security Threats and Low Intensity Interventions as the Achilles' Heel of War Powers NAME: Robert Bejesky\* BIO: \* M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.)

A numerical comparison indicates that the Framer's intended for Congress to be the dominant branch in war powers. Congressional war powers include the prerogative to "declare war;" "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," which were operations that fall short of "war"; "make Rules for Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;" "organize, fund, and maintain the nation's armed forces;" "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," "raise and support Armies," and "provide and maintain a Navy." [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n25) In contrast, the President is endowed with one war power, named as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n26)¶ The Commander-in-Chief authority is a core preclusive power, predominantly designating that the President is the head of the military chain of command when Congress activates the power. [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n27) Moreover, peripheral Commander-in-Chief powers are bridled by statutory and treaty restrictions [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n28) because the President "must respect any constitutionally legitimate restraints on the use of force that Congress has enacted." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n29) However, even if Congress has not activated war powers, the President does possess inherent authority to expeditiously and unilaterally react to defend the nation when confronted with imminent peril. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n30) Explicating the intention behind granting the President this latitude, Alexander Hamilton explained that "it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them." [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n31) The Framers drew a precise distinction by specifying that the President was empowered "to repel and not to commence war." [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.771738.1261791409&target=results_DocumentContent&returnToKey=20_T17974748742&parent=docview&rand=1376677997032&reloadEntirePage=true#n32)

### Capitalism

**The focus on ­­­­­­­­imperialism becomes an alibi for acquiescence of class struggles – they obscure the logic of capital and ensure repetition of oppression**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

Post-al logic is marked above all by its erasure of "production" as the determining force in organizing human societies and their institutions, and its insistence on "consumption" and "distribution" as the driving force of the social.5 The argument of the post-al left (briefly) is that "labor," in advanced industrial "democracies," is superseded by "information," and consequently "knowledge" (not class struggle over the rate of surplus labor) has become the driving force of history. The task of the post-al left is to deconstruct the "metaphysics of labor" and consequently to announce the end of socialism and with it the "outdatedness" of the praxis of abolishing private property (that is, congealed alienated labor) in the post-al moment. Instead of abolishing private property, an enlightened radical democracy which is to supplant socialism (as Laclau, Mouffe, Aronowitz, Butler, and others have advised) should make property holders of each citizen. The post-al left rejects the global objective conditions of production for the local subjective circumstances of consumption, and its master trope is what R-4 [France] so clearly foregrounds: the (shopping) "mall"?the ultimate site of consumption "with all latest high-tech textwares" deployed to pleasure the "body." In fact, the post-al left has "invented" a whole new interdiscipline called "cultural studies" that provides the new alibi for the regime of profit by shifting social analytics from "production" to "consumption." (On the political economy of "invention" in ludic theory, see Transformation 2 on "The Invention of the Queer.") To prove its "progressiveness," the post-al left devotes most of its energies (see the writings of John Fiske, Constance Penley, Michael Berube, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Andrew Ross, Susan Willis, Stuart Hall, Fredric Jameson), to demonstrate how "consumption" is in fact an act of production and resistance to capitalism and a practice in which a Utopian vision for a society of equality is performed! The shift from "production" to "consumption" manifests itself in post-al left theories through the focus on "superstructural" cultural analysis and the preoccupation not with the "political economy" ("base") but with "representation"? for instance, of race, sexuality, environment, ethnicity, nationality, and identity. This is, for example, one reason for [Hill's] ridiculing the "base" and "superstructure" analytical model of classical Marxism (Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) with an anecdote (the privileged mode of "argument" for the post-al left) that the base is really not all that "basic." To adhere to the base/superstructure model for [him] is to be thrown into an "epistemological gulag." For the post-al left a good society is, therefore, one in which, as [France] puts it, class antagonism is bracketed and the "surplus value" is distributed more evenly among men and women, whites and persons of color, the lesbian and the straight. It is not a society in which "surplus value"?the exploitative appropriation of the other's labor-is itself eliminated by revolutionary praxis. The post-al left's good society is not one in which private ownership is obsolete and the social division of labor (class) is abolished. Rather it is a society in which the fruit of exploitation of the proletariat (surplus labor) is more evenly distributed and a near-equality of consumption is established. This distributionist/consumptionist theory that underwrites the economic interests of the (upper)middle classes is the foundation for all the texts in this exchange and their pedagogies. A good pedagogy in these texts therefore is one in which power is distributed evenly in the classroom: a pedagogy that constructs a classroom of consensus not antagonism (thus opposition to "politicizing the classroom" in OR-1 [Hogan]) and in which knowledge (concept) is turned through the process that OR-3 [McCormick] calls "translation"?into "consumable" EXPERIENCES. The more "intense" the experience, as the anecdotes of [McCormick] show, the more successful the pedagogy. In short, it is a pedagogy that removes the student from his/her position in the social relations of production and places her/him in the personal relation of consumption: specifically, EXPERIENCE of/as the consumption of pleasure. The post-al logic **obscures** the laws of motion of capital by very specific assumptions and moves-many of which are rehearsed in the texts here. I will discuss some of these, mention others in passing, and hint at several more. (I have provided a full account of all these moves in my "Post-ality" in Transformation 1.) I begin by outlining the post-al assumptions that "democracy" is a never-ending, open "dialogue" and "conversation" among multicultural citizens; that the source of social inequities is "power"; that a post-class hegemonic "coalition," as OR-5 [Williams] calls it-and not class struggle-is the dynamics of social change; that truth (as R-l [Hill] writes) is an "epistemological gulag"? a construct of power and thus any form of "ideology critique" that raises questions of "falsehood" and "truth" ("false consciousness") does so through a violent exclusion of the "other" truths by, in [Williams'] words, "staking sole legitimate claim" to the truth in question. Given the injunction of the post-al logic against binaries (truth/falsehood), the project of "epistemology" is displaced in the ludic academy by "rhetoric." The question, consequently, becomes not so much what is the "truth" of a practice but whether it "works." (Rhetoric has always served as an alibi for pragmatism.) Therefore, [France] is not interested in whether my practices are truthful but in what effects they might have: if College Literature publishes my texts would such an act (regardless of the "truth" of my texts) end up "cutting our funding?" [he] asks. A post-al leftist like [France], in short, "resists" the state only in so far as the state does not cut [his] "funding." Similarly, it is enough for a cynical pragmatist like [Williams] to conclude that my argument "has little prospect of effectual force" in order to disregard its truthfulness. The post-al dismantling of "epistemology" and the erasure of the question of "truth," it must be pointed out, is undertaken to protect the economic interests of the ruling class. If the "truth question" is made to seem outdated and an example of an orthodox binarism ([Hill]), any conclusions about the truth of ruling class practices are excluded from the scene of social contestation as a violent logocentric (positivistic) totalization that disregards the "difference" of the ruling class. This is why a defender of the ruling class such as [Hill] sees an ideology critique aimed at unveiling false consciousness and the production of class consciousness as a form of "epistemological spanking." It is this structure of assumptions that enables [France] to answer my question, "What is wrong with being dogmatic?" not in terms of its truth but by reference to its pragmatics (rhetoric): what is "wrong" with dogmatism, [he] says, is that it is violent rhetoric ("textual Chernobyl") and thus Stalinist. If I ask what is wrong with Stalinism, again (in terms of the logic of [his] text) I will not get a political or philosophical argument but a tropological description.6 The post-al left is a New Age Left: the "new new left" privileged by [Hill] and [Williams]- the laid-back, "sensitive," listening, and dialogic left of coalitions, voluntary work, and neighborhood activism (more on these later). It is, as I will show, anti-intellectual and populist; its theory is "bite size" (mystifying, of course, who determines the "size" of the "bite"), and its model of social change is anti-conceptual "spontaneity": May 68, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and, in [Hill's] text, Chiapas. In the classroom, the New Age post-al pedagogy inhibits any critique of the truth of students' statements and instead offers, as [McCormick] makes clear, a "counseling," through anecdotes, concerning feelings. The rejection of "truth" (as "epistemological gulag"?[Hill]), is accompanied by the rejection of what the post-al left calls "economism." Furthermore, the post-al logic relativizes subjectivities, critiques functionalist explanation, opposes "determinism," and instead of closural readings, offers supplementary ones. It also celebrates eclecticism; puts great emphasis on the social as discourse and on discourse as always inexhaustible by any single interpretation? discourse (the social) always "outruns" and "exceeds" its explanation. Post-al logic is, in fact, opposed to any form of "explanation" and in favor of mimetic description: it regards "explanation" to be the intrusion of a violent outside and "description" to be a respectful, caring attention to the immanent laws of signification (inside). This notion of description which has by now become a new dogma in ludic feminist theory under the concept of "mimesis" (D. Cornell, Beyond Accommodation)?regards politics to be always immanent to practices: thus the banalities about not politicizing the classroom in [Hogan's] "anarchist" response to my text7 and the repeated opposition to binaries in all nine texts. The opposition to binaries is, in fact, an **ideological alibi for erasing class struggle**, as is quite clear in [France's] rejection of the model of a society "divided by two antagonistic classes" (see my Theory and its Other).

**The denial of the objective suffering that capitalism naturalizes violence and makes us indifferent toward limitless annihilation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994),pp. 92-114)

What is **obscured** in this representation of the non-dialogical is, of course, the violence of the dialogical. I leave aside here the violence with which these advocates of non-violent conversations attack me in their texts and cartoon. My concern is with the practices by which the post-al left, through dialogue, **naturalizes** (and eroticizes) the violence that keeps capitalist democracy in power. What is violent? Subjecting people to the **daily terrorism** of layoffs in order to maintain high rates of profit for the owners of the means of production or redirecting this violence (which gives annual bonuses, in addition to multi-million-dollar salaries, benefits, and stock options, to the CEOs of the very corporations that are laying off thousands of workers) against the ruling class in order to end class societies? What is violent? Keeping millions of people in poverty, hunger, starvation, and homelessness, and deprived of basic health care, at a time when the forces of production have reached a level that can, in fact, provide for the needs of all people, or trying to overthrow this system? What is violent? Placing in office, under the alibi of "free elections," post fascists (Italy) and allies of the ruling class (Major, Clinton, Kohl, Yeltsin) or struggling to end this farce? What is violent? Reinforcing these practices by "talking" about them in a "reasonable" fashion (that is, within the rules of the game established by the ruling class for limited reform from "within") or marking the violence of conversation and its complicity with the status quo, there by breaking the frame that represents "dialogue" as participation, when in fact it is merely a formal strategy for legitimating the established order? Any society in which the labor of many is the source of wealth for the few-all class societies-is a **society of violence**, and no amount of "talking" is going to change that **objective fact.** "Dialogue" and "conversation" are aimed at arriving at a consensus by which this violence is made more **tolerable, justifiable, and naturalized.**

#### Vote negative to endorse a political strategy that withdraws from capitalist relations

#### Universal Rejection is key – it’s the only way to hollow out capitalist structures – the debate should be a question of competing methodologies – The primary question of the ballot should be affirming an ethical orientation that best organizes against capitalist relations

Herod 4 renowned philosopher, author, and social activist

(James, “Getting Free”, <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>, accessed 8/6/09)

It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells**.** This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order.The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence**.** This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy**.** To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy**.** Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we’re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t imply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves**.** We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets**,** and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want**.** It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goa**l** of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all**.** Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world**.**

### 1nc

#### Counter-advocacy text: Mike and I advocate the 1AC sans its use of the term “colonialism”.

#### “Colonialism” has become the PC catchphrase silencing specific historical accounts and entrenching western worldviews – it justifies highly essentialist worldviews and poor scholarship

Landow 2002 [[George P. Landow,](http://www.thecore.nus.edu.sg/cv/gplbio.html) Professor of English and Art History, Brown University, “The Metaphorical Use of Colonialism and Related Terms” June 2, <http://www.thecore.nus.edu.sg/post/poldiscourse/colony2.html>]

As the Oxford English Dictionary makes clear, the word colonialism has fairly recently acquired the meaning of "alleged policy of exploitation of backward or weak peoples by a large power." The contemporary use of the this term and related ones, such as colonize, colonized, and colonialist, obvious has far different basic meanings, political implications, and emotional resonances for us than it did for many in both the nineteenth century and in the [classical ages, when it originated](http://www.thecore.nus.edu.sg/post/poldiscourse/colondef.html). In fact, the term now has such power that it provides easy, economical way for critics, particularly those involved in cultural studies and postcolonial texts, to convey their politico-moral judgments of particular phenomena while simultaneously establishing themselves as morally and politically correct. For example, one now encounters these terms applied to classes within an Imperial power ("internal colonialism") or to the relations between men and women. As the authors of [The Empire Writes Back](http://www.thecore.nus.edu.sg/post/poldiscourse/ashcroft3a.html) and Gaytrai Spivak use this trope, "Women in many societies have been relegated to the position of 'Other,' marginalized and, in a metaphorical sense, 'colonized,' forced to pursue guerrilla warfare against imperial domination from positions deeply embedded in, yet fundamentally alienated from that imperium (Spivak 1987)." Colonialism and colonize, in other words, have become codewords for any relation involving exploitation. Although authors who use them thus acquire certain rhetorical advantages typical of using politically correct and politically fashionable terms, they also create serious problems as well. In particular, as Sara Suleri and Chandra Talpade Mohanty point out, such rhetorical and metaphorical uses of terms involved with colonization unfortunately (1) turn away from the specific historical realities of colonialism and postcolonism, and (2) thereby falsely imply that we know all there is to know about these realities, particularly (3) that all colonialism and colonization was pretty much the same. Finally, (4) when applied to women, such terminology implies that all women, particularly all so-called Third World women, had the same experience and that it has to be judged by the standards and experiences of American and European feminist assumptions.

### case

**No impact to orientalism or hidden motive**

**Windschuttle,** Former Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at the University of New South Wales, **1999**

(Keith, The New Criterion, January, <http://newcriterion.com:81/archive/17/jan99/said.htm>)

In fact, Said's whole attempt to identify Oriental Studies as a cause of imperialism does not deserve to be taken seriously. The only plausible connection he establishes between Oriental scholarship and imperialism is the example of the Comte de Volney, who wrote two travel books on Syria and Egypt in the 1780s suggesting that the decaying rule of the Ottoman Empire in those countries made them ripe for political change. Napoleon used Volney's arguments to justify his brief, ill-fated expedition to Egypt in 1798, though Volney himself was an opponent of French involvement there. But nowhere else does Said provide an analysis of the thoughts and reasons of the imperial decision-makers at the time they actually entered upon Europe's Oriental adventures. At most, Said establishes that Orientalism provided the West with a command of Oriental languages and culture, plus a background mindset that convinced it of its cultural and technological advance over Islam. But these are far from sufficient causes of imperial conquest since they explain neither motives, opportunities, nor objectives.

**Instability in the region pre-dates imperialism- not root cause**

**Schweizer ’11** (Peter Schweizer, Research fellow at the Hoover Institution. A former consultant to NBC News, he also served as a member of the Ultraterrorism Study Group at the U.S. government's Sandia National Laboratory, “Stop It! The West Didn’t Cause The Middle East Mess”, <http://bigpeace.com/pschweizer/2011/02/22/stop-it-the-west-didnt-cause-the-middle-east-mess/>, February 22, 2011, LEQ)

British Prime Minister David Cameron just gave a speech in Kuwait where he proclaimed that the West has contributed to Middle Eastern instability by backing autocratic regimes. The Left has been arguing this for years. And the media has been picking up on this notion of western “guilt” as they cover the dramatic events in the region. I understand why Cameron said what he said on a political level: he’s trying to get out in front of change that seems to be sweeping the Middle East. But **the claim is absolutely ridiculous**. Repression and autocracy are organic to the Middle East. Care to read a history book about what the place was like, 150 years ago, before oil was discovered? Let’s just say it was not a pretty place. A British colonial presence actually made it a far more humane place. Repression and autocracy are not western imports. No one can seriously claim that the involvement of the west in the region has made the place worse. Indeed, **the more western a regime in the region is in its cultural and political orientation, the more free it tends to be**. Israel stands out in this regard. But even when you look at the other countries the same holds true. Kuwait or Iran? Bahrain or Libya? **The more western, the less repressive. A strong western influence means liberalization**.

**Intervention’s inevitable**

**Colla, Watson Institute for International Studies Middle East Studies director, 2003**

(Elliott, “Power, knowledge, and investment: United States foreign policy in the Middle East and the US public sphere”, Postcolonial Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, ebsco, ldg)

How might the arguments of Epic Encounters help us sort through the aftermath of 9/11? By insisting that foreign policy is not disconnected from the culture that produces it, and by insisting that US culture is no less invested in the Middle East than its oil corporations or military, McAlister suggests that one cannot hope to reorient the diplomatic relationship between the US and the Middle East unless one is prepared to radically reorient much of US culture. One cannot simply hope to change the interventionist tenor of US foreign policy by listing its inconsistencies, contradictions, and crimes, for the simple reason that US foreign interventionism is deeply embedded within a resilient ‘domestic’ culture long ﬁxated on the Middle East. This then is one of the harder lessons implied by Epic Encounters: United statesians are deeply invested in imaginary narratives and pictures of the Middle East and may or may not ever relinquish or transform them, even when they fail to explain the things they are supposed to explain

**The aff fails, leads to disengagement which re-inscribes orientalism**

Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [*Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict,* “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 67-8]

As mentioned before, the relational perspective is a critique of both the neglect of the issue of Otherness by the IR mainstream and the way in which proponents of an essentialist approach relate to the Other. For this reason, it would be natural to assume that proponents of this second attempt to "culturalize" the study of international relations would be particularly keen to address the question of how to acknowledge cultural diversity without committing the sins of orientalism. Indeed, this is also what Said is stressing in the introduction to Orientalism: The most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or nonrepressive and non-manipulative perspective. (1995: 24) However, he then goes on to add that "these are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study" (Said, 1995: 24). Looking at other analyses based on a relational conception of culture, it becomes apparent that the latter remark is very telling for this kind of understanding of culture as a whole (e.g. Doty, 1993: 315). Despite a blank rejection of the universalism of IR mainstream and, at least in principle, a recognition of the existence of different Others who are not only projections of own fantasies and desires, in practice, proponents of this alternative approach nonetheless usually leave the question of how to address and approach the actual cultural Other unanswered. This might very well be an unintended outcome of the previously mentioned radical constructivism associated with this approach. Thus, by stressing how the representation of the Other is intimately related to the construction of identities or a subtle way of performing power, one risks being caught in a kind of epistemological and moral crisis, characterized by a nagging doubt about whether it really is possible to gain any knowledge of Others or if we are just projecting our own fantasies, and by a pronounced fear that our representations are silencing voices so that we unwittingly are taking part in a subtle performance of power (Hastrup, 1992: 54). In merely dealing with the relationship between the representer and his representations, these dilemmas can be "avoided." However, at the same time one writes off the opportunity to relate to cultural diversity as anything but discursive products of one's own fantasies and projections. This is precisely the critique that supporters of the relational understanding of culture have been facing. From this perspective, it appears less surprising that Said has had so much more to offer on the dynamics of Western representations of the Middle East than on real alternatives to the orientalist depiction of the region. Unfortunately, this second bid for a culturalistic approach to the study of international relations is not only aligned with a number of very welcome critical qualities that may enrich the study of international relations. It is also related to a problematic tendency to overreact when it comes to addressing the prevalent Blindness to the Self within IR mainstream and among subscribers to the essentialist conception of culture. Thus, aspirations of promoting a larger self consciousness in the study of international relation end up becoming self-centerednes**s**, just as the attempt to promote a larger sensitivity toward the Other in reality becomes oversensitivity to saying anything substantial when it comes to actual Other. This is problematic, partly because we are left without any real idea as to how to approach actual Middle Eastern international relations rather than Western representations of these; and partly because there is the risk of losing sight of the material and very concrete consequences that specific representations may engender (Krishna, 1993). Also, the proponents of this second "culturalistic" alternative seem to be better at asking important and critical questions than at offering attractive answers.

#### The aff necessitates violent relativism and policy failure

Ray **Kiely 95**, professor of International Politics at Queen Mary University, “Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form Of Imperialism”, Journal of Contemporary Asia v25 no2 p159-78

First, as many critics have pointed out (see Habermas 1987; Dews 1987; Norris 1990), extreme versions of relativism are self-contradictory. To argue that there are no criteria by which different discourses can be assessed "looks itself suspiciously like an absolute claim to validity, and this is something which relativists hold to be impossible" (McLennan 1992: 339). Moreover, any understanding of another culture automatically leads to the acceptance that "some things can be asserted as meaningful across very different cultures" (ibid.). If this is the case then it is at least possible that there are at least some universal criteria for the assessment of all societies. Furthermore, without any universal criteria for the assessment of different societies, we are left with a situation where social science simply "rubs up against" the existing state of affairs. This is ironic given that relativism professes to be a "theory" which preaches tolerance and pluralism. In fact, at its worse it simply ignores, or even becomes an apology for all kinds of oppressive practices, or for a retreat from politics. For instance, some feminist critiques of modernity have correctly (although rather one-sidedly) emphasised that the Enlightenment project was in fact a highly particularistic one, based as it was on the emancipation of (white, bourgeois) men (Diamond and Quinby 1988: xv), and so its universalist pretensions in fact empowered only (some) men "at the expense of women and people of color." (I leave aside the totalising implications of this statement, as well as its reliance on the crudest form of Frankian underdevelopment theory.) Feminists influenced by post-modernism have therefore drawn the conclusion that the Enlightenment project of emancipation by human agents should be abandoned because it imposes an artificial - and dangerous - unity on what "in fact" is a highly fragmented society (Butler 1990). The problem with such views is that resistance is reduced to private, highly individualised acts which fail to address the real issues of social power in modern societies - Butler (1990: 338), for example champions the "resistance" of the drag performer who challenges essentialist accounts of gender identity, and thereby exposes the "radical contingency in the relationship between sex and gender." As Nussbaum (1992: 212) argues, the effect of such an extreme representational anti-humanism is actually counter-productive, for "to give up on all evaluation and, in particular, on a normative account of the human being and human functioning (is) to turn things over to the free play of forces in a world situation in which the social forces affecting the lives of women, minorities, and the poor are rarely benign." This criticism can equally be applied to the pragmatism of Rorty (1991: 258) and his followers who encourage feminists to embrace a philosophy which "gives up the claim to have right or reality on its side." Althought this recommendation is accompanied by a number of suspiciously "realist" statements (for instance, slavery is "absolutely wrong" irrespective of time and place - ibid.: 258, my emphasis), Rorty also at least recognises that his version of pragmatism is "as useful to fascists like Mussolini and conservatives like Oakeshott as it is liberals like Dewey" (ibid.: 255). Once again, such relativist notions fail to challenge the realities of power in the world today. These can only be effectively challenged (at least on an intellectual level) by a reconstruction of the emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment. In this respect, (some) feminists "can picture feminism as a movement of resistance to a certain kind of false pretension to universality, namely the appropriation by the male sex of an unfair share of natural goods and symbolic space" (Lovibond 1992: 72). Such a perspective does not reject "emancipatory meta-narratives," instead, feminism's goal is rightly seen as "the liberation of women from all forms of domination,...(as) a thoroughly modern movement insofar as it claims these ideals as legitimate and necessary for women" (Hewitt 1993: 80). These problems of relativism are similar when development issues are considered. This can be seen most clearly in the work of Marglin (1991) which, despite protestations to the contrary (1991: 26), actually ends up apologising for oppression in "traditional" societies. For instance, one chapter in this volume argues that the introduction of smallpox vaccination to India by the British was an act of imperialist domination, because it led to the eradication of the cult of Sittala Devi, the goddess to whom one prayed to avert smallpox (Apffel Marglin 1991). At least some of the contributors to this work argue that this is another example of western neglect of difference, and is based on the binary opposition between health and illness, and life and death (Marglin 1991: 8). These comments are based on an incredibly crude interpretation of the work of Jacques Derrida, whose approach to deconstruction does not entail the view that representations of "reality" are completely devoid of referential content (Derrida 1989; see also Norris 1990). Moreover, such a celebration of "tradition" essentialises and homogenises cultures in such a way that conflict is simply written out of the picture. In this respect, cultural relativism actually shares a methodology which is close to functionalist sociology and/or philosophical utilitarianism. As regards the former, relativism tends toward the view that if something exists in a "traditional" society, then it must serve a function for that society - so, for example, female circumcision is not examined on the basis of the reality of gender conflict, but through a recognition of its culturally embedded context (which has no room for conflict) (Marglin 1991: 12-14). Moreover, in maintaining a strict divide between "traditional" and "modern" forms of knowledge - a case of a binary opposition which can be deconstructed in a Derridean way - relativism actually mirrors modernisation theory, which is itself derived from functionalism (Long and Villareal 1993: 163). In terms of relativism's close association with utilitarianism, this can be seen most clearly in the work of Herrnstein-Smith (1988), who argues that no normative evaluation is better than another, and so only the market can decide what is effective in society. Although relativists would want to avoid such a political conclusion, it is clear that there is a close linkage between the rejection of any universal norms and the celebration of utility-maximising individualism. Indeed, the relativist's suspicion of the homogenising thrust of universalism (the universal subsumes the particular) closely parallels the neo-liberal/utilitarian suspicion of democracy (the democratic polity subsumes the individual freedom guaranteed by the free market). Moreover, relativism actually goes further, for it: "refuses to subject preferences, as formed in traditional societies, to any sort of critical scrutiny. It seems to assume that all criticism must be a form of imperialism, the imposition of an outsider's power on local ways. Nor does it simply claim (as do utilitarian economists) to avoid normative judgments altogether, for it actually endorses the locally formed norms as good and even romanticizes them in no small degree. It confers a bogus air of legitimacy on these deeply embedded preferences by refusing to subject them to ethical scrutiny" (Nussbaum 1992: 232). The relativist celebration of traditionalism can also be seen in its approaches to peasant agriculture and the environment. For instance, Marglin (1991: 8) argues that subsistence agriculture is preferable to commercial agriculture. It is true that the effects of commercialisation are hardly beneficial to all, as the Green Revolution in India (to cite one of many examples) showed. However, this does not mean that subsistence agriculture in itself is any better, not least because it ignores the exploitative relations which existed in non-capitalist societies (see Bernstein 1990: 69-72).(FN1) Such romantic views apply with equal force to those versions of environmentalism that uncritically celebrate a "pre-modern" respect for nature (see for instance Goldsmith 1992: xvii). In fact such views are fully compatible with those western (mis-) representations which patronise the "rest" as a romantic other (Said 1978: 118-9). The reality of the environment in pre-modern societies was in fact very different from what romanticists would have us believe. As Harvey (1993: 29) argues: "Faced with the ecological vulnerability often associated with such 'proximity to nature', indigenous groups can transform both their practices and their views of nature with startling rapidity. Furthermore, even when armed with all kinds of cultural traditions and symbolic gestures that indicate deep respect for the spirituality in nature, they can engage in extensive ecosystemic transformations that undermine their ability to continue with a given mode of production. The Chinese may have ecologically sensitive traditions of Tao, Buddhism and Confucianism (traditions of thought which have played an important role in promoting an 'ecological consciousness' in the West) but the historical geography of de-forestation, land degradation, river erosion and flooding in China contains not a few environmental events which would be regarded as catastrophes by modernday standards." Once again, these observations do not suggest that the "modern" world is better than the "traditional" world, but neither is it the case that the traditional world was an environmental utopia. Again, Harvey (1993: 30) is useful on this point: "The point here is not to argue that there is nothing new under the sun about the ecological disturbance generated by human activities, but to assess what exactly is new and unduly stressful, given the unprecedented scale of contemporary socio-ecological transformations." So, although relativism starts out with the intention of preaching tolerance and the recognition of difference, it comes dangerously close to a celebration of repression/romanticisation of the "other." In this way, it echoes those naive views of the Left which uncritically celebrated Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and similarly champion - or at least refuse to criticise - other reactionary nationalist leaders simply because they are "anti-west." For instance, many post-modern writers refused to criticise human rights abuses in Iran after the revolution. Thus according to Baudrillard (cited in Bruckner 1986: 181-2) "It makes no difference if it is at the cost of religious 'fanaticism' or moral 'terrorism' of a medieval sort. For better or for worse, it is undeniable that a ritual viciousness, one that is not at all outdated, a tribalism that does not accept Western models of a free society, can pose a real challenge to such a world order." What is startling about this perspective is its complete ignorance of the dynamics of the Iranian revolution, as well as its philosophy of "my enemy's enemy is my friend." It is also interesting how Baudrillard (and it must be said, many others on the western Left) was so prepared to take the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Iranian leadership at face value, something that subsequent events (the Iran-Contra scandal) showed to be hollow.(FN2) Moreover, the political dangers of relativism go further than this. Again it needs stressing that relativism provides no means for assessing truth. But if this is the case, then "(w)hat possible ground could we have, on these assumptions, for preferring the testimony of death camp survivors or the archival research of serious historians of the Holocaust over the accounts of revisionists who deny Nazi genocide? Why think proapartheid apologetics qualitatively different from or inferior to the work of liberal, radical or socialist South African writers?" (Howe 1993: 37) A few more examples show the absurdity of the need to ask such questions. If we accept the Marglins argument that the "binary opposition" between life and death is a western one, then we have no way of effectively criticising the massacres carried out by the colonial powers. Neither do we have any grounds for complaining when food is exported from one impoverished region or country to another, richer area, because starvation is a concept based on the western binary opposition between life and death. Then there is the aforementioned contention of Baudrillard (see Norris 1992: 192-6) that the Gulf War did not take place. Need I really go on citing such absurdities? One more example is important though, because it shows how relativism actually mirrors those (right-wing) versions of the Enlightenment which posit the view that "West is best." This is the case of western reactions to the Rushdie affair. In this case some writers (among them Anthony Burgess and Fay Weldon) argued that the fatwa against Rushdie showed that the west had a superior culture in that it preached tolerance, as against an intolerant and oppressive religion (Islam). Some on the Left (at least in the west - the Left in the Middle East was generally very supportive of Rushdie) were less than willing to support Rushdie, and this was justified on the basis of a respect for other cultures. However, what both sides failed to do was challenge the notion of Islam that was cited in these debates. Both side shared an essentialist view of Islam, which reduced it to an ahistorical religion devoid of any conflicting interpretations. In fact, "Islamic fundamentalism" refers to a variety of movements which are highly political and modern in character, and which are based on only one of a number of interpretations of the Koran (see Al-Azmeh 1993: 10-14; Hitchens 1993: 289-302). In this respect, "fundamentalism" itself dehistoricises Islam, a position shared by Eurocentrics and relativists alike (Al-Azmeh 1993: chs. 4 and 7). The convergence between these supposedly diverse position shows how politically correct "anti-colonial" relativism actually "reproduce(s) all the worst features of colonialist writing itself; of the myths of group destiny and cultural exclusivism fostered by the propagandists of imperial expansion" - in this way, such views have much in common with those of Pol Pot and Slobodan Milosevic (Howe 1992: 37; see also Hughes 1993). Of course many relativists would halt at some point and would criticise different forms of oppression. For instance, Lyotard (1984: 66-7) has attempted to rescue the concept of justice from a complete relativism, and Rorty's comments on slavery cited above suggest that his pragmatism is compromised by at least some commitment to universalism. But if this is the case, then how consistent are they being when the very starting point of post-modernist accounts is a rejection of universal principles? Without some acceptance of universalism, how can different forms of oppression be criticised? Post-marxists such as Laclau (1990) have attempted to avoid this trap by stressing the need (a universal one?) for different emancipations based on radical democracy. However, Laclau deliberately avoids any description of what actually constitutes radical democracy on the grounds that "ambiguity and indeterminacy are central features of democracy" (ibid.: 169). The problem with this view is of course that democracy then becomes simply how a particular locality chooses to define it. What is useful in the work of the relativists is the critique of those western notions of justice and truth which are used to defend oppressive practices. I have argued elsewhere (Kiely, forthcoming) that one of the worst problems in development studies has been to impose abstract models of development in very different social contexts, and so these models become forms of imposing power on societies. This is undoubtedly the great strength of post-modernist critiques of social theory - although, it should be noted that this critique is hardly a new one, as a similar critique was made in the 1950s by the conservative philosopher Karl Popper (1986) (and, at least implicitly, by Marx in his letters to Zasulich). Neither is it limited to writers who associate themselves with an "anti-truth" position (see Said 1978; 1993a; 1993b: 28; also, see Slater 1992; Parpart 1993; Squires 1993). Indeed, the critique is at least as old as the Enlightenment itself (see Hamilton 1992). What is unacceptable about "hard" post-modern critiques is the tendency to lapse into nihilism. In other words, it is precisely because development models have led to oppressive practices that we need a better, more truthful account of the world in order to challenge these practices - a theory which rejects models if you like. In this respect, deconstruction is best seen as expression of an attitude towards truth of "never simply" rather than "simply never" (the terms are taken from Norris 1993). Of course, the search for better accounts of the world is ultimately a practical activity; that is, an activity that can never be divorced from the actual concrete situation of "real, living individuals." However, social science can still play a role in at least providing a limited framework for specifying the conditions for a better life for humanity. Attacking this problem is precisely what pragmatists like Rorty and relativists like Lyotard reject, but in so doing they fall back into a political position which is potentially a crude justification for the way things are.

## 2NC

### MARXISM

#### You have an ethical obligation to reject capitalism – it’s costs are beyond calculation

**Zizek & Daly, 04** (Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northhampton, Conversations with Zizek p. 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian- Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico- discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle.

**The aff’s approach to knowledge which privileges subjectivity and uncertainty denies the objectivity in class relations and the oppression that is produced from capital accumulation**

**Zavarzadeh 94** (Mas'Ud, The Stupidity That Consumption Is Just as Productive as Production": In the Shopping Mall of the Post-al Left," College Literature, Vol. 21, No. 3, The Politics of Teaching Literature 2 (Oct., 1994), pp. 92-114)

**The unsurpassable objectivity** which is **not open** to rhetorical **interpretation** and constitutes the decided foundation of critique is the "outside" that Marx calls the "Working Day" (Capital 1: 340-416). ([France] willfully misrecognizes my notion of objectivity by confusing my discussion of identity politics and objectivity.) The working day is not what it seems: its reality, like the reality of all capitalist practices, is an alienated reality-there is a contradiction between its appearance and its essence. It "appears" as if the worker, during the working day, receives wages that are equal compensation for his labor. This mystification originates in the fact that the capitalist pays not for "labor" but for "labor power": when labor power is put to use it produces more than it is paid for. The "working day" is the site of the unfolding of this fundamental contradiction: it is a divided day, divided into "necessary labor" the part in which the worker produces value equivalent to his wages and the "other," the part of "surplus labor"?a part in which the worker works for free and produces "surplus value." The second part of the working day is the source of profit and accumulation of capital. "Surplus labor" is the OBJECTIVE FACT of capitalist relations of production: without "surplus labor" there will be no profit, and without profit there will be no accumulation of capital, and without accumulation of capital there will be no capitalism. The goal of bourgeois economics is to conceal this part of the working day, and it should therefore be no surprise that, as a protector of ruling class interests in the academy, [Hill], with a studied casualness, places "surplus value" in the adjacency of "radical bible-studies" and quietly turns it into a rather boring matter of interest perhaps only to the dogmatic. To be more concise: "surplus labor" is that **objective, unsurpassable "outside**" that cannot be made part of the economies of the "inside" without capitalism itself being transformed into socialism. Revolutionary critique is grounded in this truth-objectivity-since all social institutions and practices of capitalism are founded upon the objectivity of surplus labor. The role of a revolutionary pedagogy of critique is to produce class consciousness so as to assist in organizing people into a new vanguard party that aims at abolishing this FACT of the capitalist system and trans-forming capitalism into a communist society. As I have argued in my "Postality" [Transformation 1], (post)structuralist theory, through the concept of "representation," makes all such facts an effect of interpretation and turns them into "undecidable" processes. The boom in ludic theory and Rhetoric Studies in the bourgeois academy is caused by the service it renders the ruling class: it makes the OBJECTIVE reality of the extraction of surplus labor a subjective one-not a decided fact but a matter of "interpretation." In doing so, it "deconstructs" (see the writings of such bourgeois readers as Gayatri Spivak, Cornel West, and Donna Haraway) the labor theory of value, displaces production with consumption, and resituates the citizen from the revolutionary cell to the ludic shopping mall of [France].

#### They The 1ac puts the symbolic treasure of the victimized into circulation for political gain in the vacuous world of debate, creating epistemic violence through the commodification

**DAVILA in 2002** (Juan, Artist, http://www.abc.net.au/arts/visual/stories/s534433.htm)

Alberto Moreiras and Slavoj Zizek argue that **late capitalism disavows the experience of the other**. The erasure of the public and the private domains makes it very difficult to remain open to the other. **We are conditioned not to act, not to intervene, and not to change. Instead we have pseudo- radical topics, frenetic humanism, liberal paranoia, commerce and passivity.** In this paranoid universe of ours capitalism legitimizes itself through anti-capitalist ideology: renounce the endeavour of relating to the world, have control through indifference and distance, reject upheaval as foreign to our inner selves. To be dehumanized buyers, full of choices is our noble work in the spectacle of our "real world". In Australia today we have concentration camps to detain refugees. We demand that they justify themselves. We have created a modern master and a non-modern slave. Ashis Nandi says that the slave "represents a higher-order cognition which perforce includes the master as human, whereas the master's cognition has to exclude the slave as a 'thing'. Ultimately, modern oppression, as opposed to traditional oppression, is not an encounter between the self and the enemy, the rulers and the ruled, or the gods and the demons. It is a battle between dehumanized self and the objectified enemy, the technologized bureaucrat and his reified victim, pseudo-rulers and their fearsome selves projected on to their 'subjects'". Australia is joined with the USA in an obscene pact of military bonding - the war of Western civilizations against the barbaric others. As Moreiras and Zizek argue, it seems that **our culture requires for its survival a vilified figure** like the refugee**. He or she seems to be complete and that is intolerable, since they inhabit the borders of capitalism. We disavow their lack. We steal from them (their rights, their freedom, their name, their family) to pretend that they are indeed complete. We are in love: we steal what they do not possess. We dupe them, we put their symbolic treasure in circulation for political gain, to confirm the need for the virtual spectacle of war. Like a market commodity they are outsourced.** In a mass delusion we use deception in the guise of truth. We delegate belief to the politician's discourse and deprive ourselves of the naïve belief in the other.

#### Their pseudo-marxist turns are a means of diffusing material criticism of capital – they attempt to contextualize capital into a localized problem which destroys universal class consciousness

Tumino 1

[Stephen, Prof. English @ Pitt, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique)

A parody of politics has taken over left politics in the U.S. and Europe. A parody in which—after the dead-end of the designer socialisms of postmarxisms—suddenly everyone is an "orthodox" Marxist: from Zizek who in the introduction to a selection of his work writes of the need to "return to the centrality of the Marxist critique of political economy" (Reader ix); to Michael Sprinker who referred to himself as a "neo-conservative marxist" ("Forum" 68). In calling himself a "neoconservative" Sprinker was embracing with pride Butler's definition of the term in her "Merely Cultural" in which she equates it with "leftist orthodoxy" (268). Then there is Paul Smith who now, after mocking Orthodox Marxism in Discerning the Subject and Universal Abandon, says he has a "fairly orthodox understanding of what Marx and the Marxist tradition has had to say about capitalism" (Millennial Dreams 3). Parody is always the effect of a slippage and the slippage here is that in spite of the sudden popularity of "orthodox" Marxism, the actual theories and practices of the newly orthodox are more than ever before flexodox. It seems as if once more Lenin's notion that when the class antagonism emerges more sharply "the liberals. . . dare not deny the class struggle, but attempt to narrow down [and] to curtail. . . the concept" ("Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle," 122) has been proven by history. "Orthodox" Marxism has become the latest cover by which the bourgeois left authenticates its credentials and proceeds to legitimate the economics of the ruling class and its anti-proletarian politics. Take Paul Smith, for example. In Orthodox Marxism class is the central issue. (I put aside here that in his writings, on subjectivity for example, Smith has already gotten rid of the "central" by a deconstructive logic). What Smith does with class is a rather interesting test of how Orthodox Marxism is being used to legitimate the class interests of the owners. Smith reworks class and turns it into a useless Habermasian communicative act. He writes that "classes are what are formed in struggle, not something that exists prior to struggle" (Millennial Dreams 60). To say it again: the old ideological textualization of the "new left" is not working any more (just look at the resistance against globalization), so the ruling class is now reworking the "old left" to defend itself. Against the Orthodox Marxist theory of class, Smith evacuates class of an objective basis in the extraction of surplus labor in production, and makes it the effect of local conflicts. In short, Smith reverses the Orthodox Marxist position that, "It is not the consciousness of [wo]men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness" (Marx, Contribution, 21), and turns it into a neomarxist view that what matters is their consciousness. In this he in fact shares a great deal with conservative theories that make "values" (the subjective) as what matters in social life and not economic access.

\*edited for gendered language

**Intersectionality/particular movements has historically footnoted the criticism of Capitalism—only a PRIORITIZATION of class struggle has the potential of universalizing our form of politics**

McLaren and D’Anniballe 4 (Peter, Professor at the Graduate School of Education at UCLA, and Valerie “Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference’”, Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia)

In stating this, we need to include an **important caveat that differentiates our approach** from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet **which can sound**, to the uninitiated, both **radical and vaguely Marxian**. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical**, social dimension or treated** solely **as a cultural phenomenon**—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is **transformed** from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signifies a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class . As a result, many post-Marxists have also **stripped the idea of class** of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status **as a universal form of exploitation** whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time , then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential significance , Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority , however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of **which split sets into motion all of the others**, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an **instrument of enforcement and control**, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism **so long as class society stands**, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124)

#### The perm is co-opted into the language of reformism – capital is like a many headed hydra – only totalizing rejection solves

Kovel 2

(Joel, Alger Hiss Prof. At Bard, The Enemy of Nature, Zed Books, p. 142-3)

The value-term that subsumes everything into the spell of capital sets going a kind of wheel of accumulation, from production to consumption and back, spinning ever more rapidly as the inertial mass of capital grows, and generating its force field as a spinning magnet generates an electrical field. This phenomenon has important implications for the reformability of the system. Because capital is so spectral, and succeeds so well in ideologically mystifying its real nature, attention is constantly deflected from the actual source of eco-destabilization to the instruments by which that source acts. The real problem, however, is the whole mass of globally accumulated capital, along with the speed of its circulation and the class structures sustaining this. That is what generates the force field, in proportion to its own scale; and it is this force field, acting across the numberless points of insertion that constitute the ecosphere, that creates ever larger agglomerations of capital, sets the ecological crisis going, and keeps it from being resolved. For one fact may be taken as certain — that to resolve the ecological crisis as a whole, as against tidying up one corner or another, is radically incompatible with the existence of gigantic pools of capital, the force field these induce, the criminal underworld with which they connect, and, by extension, the elites who comprise the transnational bourgeoisie. And by not resolving the crisis as a whole, we open ourselves to the spectre of another mythical creature, the many-headed hydra, that regenerated itself the more its individual tentacles were chopped away. To realize this is to recognize that there is no compromising with capital, no schema of reformism that will clean up its act by making it act more greenly or efficiently We shall explore the practical implications of this thesis in Part III, and here need simply to restate the conclusion in blunt terms: green capital, or non-polluting capital, is preferable to the immediately ecodestructive breed on its immediate terms. But this is the lesser point, and diminishes with its very success. For green capital (or ‘socially/ecologically responsible investing’) exists, by its very capital-nature, essentially to create more value, and this leaches away from the concretely green location to join the great pool, and follows its force field into zones of greater concentration, expanded profitability — and greater ecodestruction.

**Turn: Interpassivity—the direct call to action without the universalist element of our alternative leads to interpassivity which allows capitalism to subsume our movement**

**Zizek, 02** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the University of Ljubljana Revolution at the gates p.169- 171)

Indeed, since the "normal" functioning of capitalism involves some kind of disavowal of the basic principle of its functioning (today's model capitalist is someone who, after ruthlessly generating profit, then generously shares parts of it, giving large donations to churches, victims of ethnic or sexual abuse etc., posing as a humanitarian), the ultimate act of transgression is ‑to assert this principle directly, depriving it of its humanitarian mask. I am Therefore tempted to reverse Marx's Thesis 11: the first task today is Precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to intervene directly and Change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul‑de‑sac of debilitating impossibility: "What can we do against global capital? "), but to question he hegemonic ideological coordinates. In short, our historical moment is ,till that of Adorno:To the question "What should we do?" I can most often truly answer only with "I don't know." I can only try to analyse rigorously what there is. Here people reproach me: When you practise criticism, you are also obliged to say how one should make it better. To my mind, this is incontrovertibly a bourgeois prejudice. Many times in history it so happened that the very works which pursued purely theoretical goals transformed consciousness, and thereby also social reality. 5If, today, we follow a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space ‑ it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates‑ those who "really want to do something to help people" get ‑involved in (undoubtedly honourable) exploits like Medecins sans frontieres ‑,Greenpeace, feminist and anti‑racist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly encroach an economic territory (for example, denouncing and boycotting companies which do not respect ecological conditions, or use child labour ‑ they are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. This kind of activity provides the perfect example of interpassivity: of doing things not in order to achieve something, but to prevent something from really happening, really changing. All this frenetic humanitarian, politically Correct, etc., activity fits the formula of "Let's go on changing something all the time so that, globally, things will remain the same!". If standard Cultural Studies criticize capitalism, they do so in the coded way hat exemplifies Hollywood liberal paranoia: the enemy is "the system", the hidden "organization", the anti‑democratic "conspiracy", not simply capitalism and state apparatuses. The problem with this critical stance is not only that it replaces concrete social analysis with a struggle against abstract paranoiac fantasies, but that ‑ in a typical paranoiac gesture ‑ it unnecessarily redoubles social reality, as if there were a secret Organization behind the "visible" capitalist and state organs. What we should accept is that there is no need for a secret " organization‑within‑ an‑ organization": the "conspiracy" is already in the "visible" organization as such, in the capital system, in the way the political space and state apparatuses work.

**Historical Method comes first – this debate is not about what the aff does but rather was the aff formulated with accurate knowledge on history – we must ground our debates in accurate historical methods that only Marxism can account for – their method prevents a transition to a society beyond oppression**

**TUMINO** **1**

(Stephen, Prof. English @ Pitt, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to **offer an integrated understanding of social practices** and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This **systematic inequality** **cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions** and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments **authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies**. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

## 1NR

### Framework

1. **Stasis –**

**Zwarensteyn 12**, Ellen, Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Masters of Science, “High School Policy Debate as an Enduring Pathway to Political Education: Evaluating Possibilities for Political Learning,” August, <http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1034&context=theses>

Galloway (2007) also advances an argument concerning the privileging of the resolution as a basis for debating. Galloway (2007) cites three pedagogical advantages to seeing the resolution and the first affirmative constructive as an invitation to dialogue. “First, all teams have equal access to the resolution. Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. Finally, the resolution represents a community consensus of worthwhile and equitably debatable topics rooted in a collective history and experience of debate” (p. 13). An important starting point for conversation, the resolution helps frame political conversations humanely. It preserves basic means for equality of access to base research and argumentation. Having a year-long stable resolution invites depth of argument and continuously rewards adaptive research once various topics have surfaced through practice or at debate tournaments.

**Limits –**

**Rowland ’84 -** (Robert C., Baylor U., “Topic Selection in Debate”, American Forensics in Perspective. Ed. Parson, p. 53-4)

The first major problem identified by the work group as relating to topic selection is the decline in participation in the National Debate Tournament (NDT) policy debate. As Boman notes: There is a growing dissatisfaction with academic debate that utilizes a policy proposition. Programs which are oriented toward debating the national policy debate proposition, so-called “NDT” programs, are diminishing in scope and size.4 This decline in policy debate is tied, many in the work group believe, to excessively broad topics. The most obvious characteristic of some recent policy debate topics is extreme breath. A resolution calling for regulation of land use literally and figuratively covers a lot of ground. Naitonal debate topics have not always been so broad. Before the late 1960s the topic often specified a particular policy change.5 The move from narrow to broad topics has had, according to some, the effect of limiting the number of students who participate in policy debate. First, the breadth of the topics has all but destroyed novice debate. Paul Gaske argues that because the stock issues of policy debate are clearly defined, it is superior to value debate as a means of introducing students to the debate process.6 Despite this advantage of policy debate, Gaske belives that NDT debate is not the best vehicle for teaching beginners. The problem is that broad policy topics terrify novice debaters, especially those who lack high school debate experience. They are unable to cope with the breadth of the topic and experience “negophobia,”7 the fear of debating negative. As a consequence, the educational advantages associated with teaching novices through policy debate are lost: “Yet all of these benefits fly out the window as rookies in their formative stage quickly experience humiliation at being caugh without evidence or substantive awareness of the issues that confront them at a tournament.”8 The ultimate result is that fewer novices participate in NDT, thus lessening the educational value of the activity and limiting the number of debaters or eventually participate in more advanced divisions of policy debate. In addition to noting the effect on novices, participants argued that broad topics also discourage experienced debaters from continued participation in policy debate. Here, the claim is that it takes so much times and effort to be competitive on a broad topic that students who are concerned with doing more than just debate are forced out of the activity.9 Gaske notes, that “broad topics discourage participation because of insufficient time to do requisite research.”10 The final effect may be that entire programs either cease functioning or shift to value debate as a way to avoid unreasonable research burdens. Boman supports this point: “It is this expanding necessity of evidence, and thereby research, which has created a competitive imbalance between institutions that participate in academic debate.”11 In this view, it is the competitive imbalance resulting from the use of broad topics that has led some small schools to cancel their programs.

**That turns education – the education in debate doesn’t come from the other team lecturing you it comes from the discussion that occurs within the round – if we win they make that discussion impossible that’s a reason they can’t solve any of their offense –otherwise result in the same authoritative exclusion that they critique**

Morson 4—Northwestern prof (Greg, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning, 317-23)

Sarah Freedman and Arnetha Ball describe learning as a dialogic process. It is not merely a transmission of knowledge, but an activity in which whole selves are formed and acquire new capacities for development. We live in a world of enormous cultural diversity, and the various languages and points of view – ideologies in Bakhtin’s sense – of students have become a fact that cannot be ignored. Teachers need to enter into a dialogue with those points of view and to help students do the same. For difference may best be understood not as an obstacle but as an opportunity. ¶ The range of “authoritative” and “innerly persuasive discourses” in our classrooms appears to be growing along with our cultural diversity. Freedman and Ball observe: “This rich and complex ‘contact zone’ inside the classroom yields plentiful opportunity for students to decide what will be internally persuasive for them, and consequently for them to develop their ideologies. This diversity presents both challenges and opportunities as teachers seek to guide their students on this developmental journey” (pp. 8– 9, this volume). The journey they have in mind does not so much lead to a particular goal as establish an ever-enriching process of learning. ¶ Freedman and Ball’s approach grows out of Bakhtin’s key concepts, especially one that has been largely neglected in research on him: “ideological becoming” (see Chapter 1, this volume). The implications of the essays in this volume therefore extend well beyond educational theory and practice to the humanities and social sciences generally. How does a thinking person– and we are all thinking people – develop? What happens when ideas, embodied in specific people with particular voices, come into dialogic contact? What factors guide the creation of a point of view on the world? The specific problematic of pedagogy serves as a lens to make the broader implications of such questions clearer.¶ 318¶ Authority and testing ¶ How does a person develop a point of view on the world, a set of attitudes for interpreting and evaluating it ? How systematic is that point of view? Is our fundamental take on the world a philosophy with implicit doctrines or is it more like a set of inclinations and a way of probing? Perhaps it is not one, but a collection of ways of probing, a panoply of skills and habits, which a person tries out one after another the way in which one may, in performing a physical task, reach for one tool after another? What does our point of view have to do with our sense of ourselves, whether as individuals or as members of groups? What role does formal education play in acquiring and shaping it? What happens when contrary evidence confronts us or when the radical uncertainty of the world impinges on us? Whatever that “point of view” is, how does it change over time ? ¶ In any given culture or subculture, there tends to be what Bakhtin would call an “authoritative” perspective. However, the role of that perspective is not necessarily authoritarian. Despite Bakhtin’s experience as a Soviet citizen, where the right perspective on just about all publicly identified perspectives was held to be already known and certain, he was well aware that outside that circle of presumed certainty life was still governed by opinion. It is not just that rival ideologies – Christian, liberal, and many others – were still present; beyond that, each individual’s experiences led to half-formed but strongly held beliefs that enjoyed no formal expression. Totalitarianism was surely an aspiration of the Soviet and other such regimes, but it could never realize its ideal of uniformity–“the new Soviet man” who was all of a piece – for some of the same reasons it could not make a centrally planned economy work. There is always too much contingent, unexpected, particular, local, and idiosyncratic, with a historical or personal background that does not fit. ¶ Bakhtin may be viewed as the great philosopher of all that does not fit. He saw the world as irreducibly messy, unsystematizable, and contingent, and he regarded it as all the better for that. For life to have meaning, it must possess what he called “surprisingness.” If individual people are to act morally, they cannot displace their responsibility onto some systematic ideology, whether Marxist, Christian, or any other. What I do now is not reducible to any ethical, political, or metaphysical system; and I – each “I”– must take responsibility for his or her acts at this moment. As Bakhtin liked to say, there is “no alibi.” ¶ Authoritative words in their fully expressed form purport to offer an alibi. They say, like Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: we speak the truth and you need not question, only obey, for your conscience to be at rest. Yet, every authoritative word is spoken or heard in a milieu of difference. It may try to insulate itself from dialogue with reverential tones, a special script, and all the other signs of the authority fused to it, but at the margins¶ 319¶ dialogue waits with a challenge: you may be right, but you have to convince me. Once the authoritative word responds to that challenge, it ceases to be fully authoritative. To be sure, it may still command considerable deference by virtue of its past, its moral aura, and its omnipresence. But it has ceased to be free from dialogue and its authority has changed from unquestioned to dialogically tested. Every educator crosses this line when he or she gives reasons for a truth. ¶ My daughter once had a math teacher who, when asked why a certain procedure was used to solve an equation, would reply, “because some old, dead guy said so.” Of course, no answer could be further from the spirit of mathematics, where logic counts for everything and authority for nothing. Nobody proves the Pythagorean theorem by saying Pythagoras said so. Compare this reply with actually showing the logic of a procedure so the student understands the “why.” In that case, one immediately admits that there must be a good reason for proceeding in a certain way, and that it needs to be shown. The procedure does not end up as less sure because of this questioning; quite the contrary. Rather, questioning is seen as intrinsic to mathematics itself, which enjoys its authority precisely because it has survived such questioning. ¶ Even in fields that do not admit of mathematical proof, an authoritative word does not necessarily lose all authority when questioning enters into it. We can give no mathematically sure reason why democracy is preferable to dictatorship or market economies are generally more productive than command economies. But we can give reasons, which admit the possibilities of challenges we had not foreseen and may have to think about. Education and all inquiry are fundamentally different when the need for reasons is acknowledged and when questioning becomes part of the process of learning. Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable. ¶ In short, authoritative words may or may not be authoritarian. In the Soviet Union, authoritarian words were the norm and questioning was seen as suspect. One no more questioned Marxism-Leninism than one questioned the law of gravity (a common comparison, suggesting that each was equally sure). What the Party said was right because it was the outcome of sure historical laws guaranteeing the correctness of its rulings. Education reflected this spirit. Bakhtin’s embrace of dialogue, then, challenged not so much the economic or historical theories the regime propounded, but its very concept of truth and the language of truth it embraced. Dialogue by its very nature invites questioning, thrives on it, demands it. ¶ It follows from Bakhtin’s argument that nonauthoritarian authoritative words are not necessarily weaker than authoritarian ones. After all, one may believe something all the more because one has questioned it, provided that defenders have been willing to answer and have been more or less cogent in their defense. They need not answer all objections perfectly – we are often convinced with qualifications, with a “just in case,” with “loopholes.”¶ 320¶ However, they must demonstrate that the authority is based on generally sound reasons. Morever, for many, enormous persuasive power lies in the very fact that the authoritative belief is so widely held. Everyone speaks it, even if with ironizing quotation marks. ¶ An authoritative word of this nonauthoritarian kind functions not as a voice speaking the Truth, but as a voice speaking the one point of view that must be attended to. It may be contested, rejected, or modified, the way in which church dogmas are modified over time by believers, but it cannot be ignored. Think of Huck Finn (discussed by Mark Dressman, this volume). Even when he cannot bring himself to turn in Jim as a runaway slave, he accepts the authority of the social voice telling him that such an action would be right. He does not question that voice, just realizes he will not follow it and will do “wrong.” Much of the moral complexity of this book lies in Huck’s self-questioning, as he does what we believe to be right but what he thinks of as wrong; and if we read this book sensitively, we may ask ourselves how much of our own behavior is Huckish in this respect. Perhaps our failure to live up to our ideals bespeaks our intuition without overt expression that there is something wrong with those ideals. What Huck demonstrates is that there may be a wisdom, even a belief system, in behavior itself: we always know more than we know, and our moral sensitivity may be different from, and wiser than, our professed beliefs. ¶ our own authoritative words ¶ The basic power of an authoritative voice comes from its status as the one that everyone hears. Everyone has heard that democracy is good and apartheid is bad, that the environment needs preserving, that church must not be merged with state; and people who spend their lives in an academic environment may add many more to the list. In our academic subculture, we are, almost all of us, persuaded of the rightness of greater economic equality, of plans for inclusion and affirmative action, of abortion rights, of peace, of greater efforts to reach out to all the people in the world in all their amazing diversity. These are our authoritative voices, and , too, we may accept either because they are simply not to be questioned or because we have sought out intelligent opponents who have questioned them and have thought about, if not ultimately accepted, their answers. Again, educators know the moment when a student from a background different from ours questions one of our beliefs and we experience the temptation to reply like that math teacher. Thinking of ourselves as oppositional, we often forget that we, too, have our own authoritative discourse and must work to remember that, in a world of difference, authority may not extend to those unlike us. ¶ The testable authoritative voice: we hear it always, and though some may disagree with it, they cannot ignore it. Its nonauthoritarian power is based¶ 321¶ above all on its ubiquity. In a society that is relatively open to diverse values, that minimal, but still significant, function of an authoritative voice is the most important one. It demands not adherence but attention. And such a voice is likely to survive far longer than an authoritarian voice whose rejection is necessarily its destruction. We have all these accounts of Soviet dissidents – say, Solzhenitsyn – who tell their story as a “narrative of rethinking” (to use Christian Knoeller’s phrase): they once believed in Communist ideology, but events caused them to raise some questions that by their nature could not be publicly voiced, and that silence itself proved most telling. You can hear silence if it follows a pistol shot. If silence does not succeed in ending private questioning, the word that silence defends is decisively weakened. The story of Soviet dissidents is typically one in which, at some point, questioning moved from a private, furtive activity accompanied by guilt to the opposite extreme, a clear rejection in which the authoritative voice lost all hold altogether. Vulnerability accompanies too much power. ¶ But in more open societies, and in healthier kinds of individual development, an authoritative voice of the whole society, or of a particular community (like our own academic community), still sounds, still speaks to us in our minds. In fact, we commonly see that people who have questioned and rejected an authoritative voice find that it survives within them as a possible alternative, like the minority opinion in a court decision. When they are older, they discover that experience has vindicated some part of what they had summarily rejected. Perhaps the authoritative voice had more to it than we thought when young? Now that we are teachers, perhaps we see some of the reasons for practices we objected to? Can we, then, combine in a new practice both the practices of our teachers and the new insights we have had? When we do, a flexible authoritative word emerges, one that has become to a great extent an innerly persuasive one. By a lengthy process, the word has, with many changes, become our own, and our own word has in the process acquired the intonations of authority. ¶ In much the same way, we react to the advice of our parents. At some point it may seem dated, no more than what an earlier generation unfortunately thought, or we may greet it with the sign of regret that our parents have forgotten what they experienced when our age. However, the dialogue goes on. At a later point, we may say, you know, there was wisdom in what our parents said, only why did they express it so badly? If only I had known! We may even come to the point where we express some modified form of parental wisdom in a convincing voice. We translate it into our own idiolect, confident that we will not make the mistakes of our parents when we talk to our children. Then our children listen, and find our own idiolect, to which we have devoted such painful ideological and verbal work, hopelessly dated, and the process may start again. ¶ It is always a difficult moment when we realize that our own voice is now the authority, especially because we have made it different, persuasive in its¶ 322¶ own terms, not like our parents’ voice. When we reflect on how our children see us, we may even realize that our parents’ authoritative words may not have been the product of blind acceptance, but the result of a process much like our own. They may have done the same thing we did – question, reject, adapt, arrive at a new version – and that rigid voice of authority we heard from them was partly in our own ears. Can we somehow convey to our students our own words so they do not sound so rigid? We all think we can. But so did our parents (and other authorities).¶ Dialogue, Laughter, And Surprise ¶ Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagreefff. ¶ So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? ¶ We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. ¶ 323¶ For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. ¶ Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance. By contrast, if one’s rebellion against an authoritative word is truly dialogic, that is unlikely to happen, or to be subject to more of a self-check if it does. Then one questions one’s own certainties and invites skepticism, lest one become what one has opposed. One may even step back and laugh at oneself. ¶ Laughter at oneself invites the perspective of the other. Laughter is implicitly pluralist. Instead of looking at one’s opponents as the unconditionally wrong, one imagines how one sounds to them. Regarding earlier authorities, one thinks: that voice of authority, it is not my voice, but perhaps it has something to say, however wrongly put. It comes from a specific experience, which I must understand. I will correct it, but to do that I must measure it, test it, against my own experience. Dialogue is a process of real testing, and one of the characteristics of a genuine test is that the result is not guaranteed. It may turn out that sometimes the voice of earlier authority turns out to be right on some point. Well, we will incorporate that much into our own “innerly persuasive voice.” Once one has done this, once one has allowed one’s own evolving convictions to be tested by experience and by other convictions

**Predictable ground is key to effective dialogue---monopolizing strategy makes discussion one-sided and subverts inclusion of the neg--- turns their inclusion arguments**

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure.¶ Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table.¶ When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.¶ Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning:¶ Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197).¶ **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).¶ For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

Switch Side debate and policy simulation key to activism training

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(Christopher C., Spring, 199, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377)

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates,jjj observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense.